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People are social animals; many of our good and bad 
behaviors take place in groups. A recent study by Weisel 
and Shalvi shows that “collaborative settings led people to 
engage in excessive dishonest behavior” (2015, p. 10655). 
The effects are large, spurring concern about harmful real-
life consequences. Here, we report two preregistered stud-
ies that replicate the original findings, but with a smaller 
effect size. Moreover, our findings suggest that context 
moderates corruption in collaboration.
Weisel and Shalvi (2015) examined corrupt collaboration 
using a novel sequential dyadic die-rolling paradigm. In 
their Aligned outcomes condition, player A privately rolls 
a die and reports the outcome to player B (anonymously). 
Next, player B privately rolls a die and reports the outcome 
to player A (anonymously). If both players reported the 
same number, they earned money; otherwise, they earned 
nothing. This interaction was repeated for 20 trials. The 
number of reported doubles was the dependent variable. 
Participants reported a double on 81.5% of trials. This is 
a staggering 489% more than the chance expectation of 
16.7%, and vastly more than the 54.9% doubles that lone 
players throwing twice report.
Weisel and Shalvi (2015) tested students used to par-
ticipating in economic studies. In Study 1, we conducted 
a preregistered replication study1 of their Aligned out-
comes condition to test whether their effect generalizes 
to students used to participating in psychological but 
not economic studies (see Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, in 
press). Our results2 are consistent with those of Weisel and 
Shalvi: participants reported a higher percentage of dou-
bles (29.6%) than expected by chance (16.7%; generalized 
linear mixed model (GLMM): χ2(1) = 10.63, p < .002; see 
Appendix A for details). However, our results indicate a 
lower rate of corruption, with participants reporting fewer 
doubles than found by Weisel and Shalvi (GLMM: χ2(1) = 
31.01, p < .001; Table 1)3.
There are multiple, mutually compatible explanations 
for the observed difference in effect sizes. Research shows 
that published effect sizes tend to overestimate true 
effect sizes, and such overestimation tends to be greater 
in pioneering studies that are the first to report an effect, 
a ‘decline effect’ (Anderson, Kelley, & Maxwell, 2017; 
Ioannidis, 2008; Simonsohn, 2015). It is possible that the 
effect sizes observed by Weisel and Shalvi (2015) overes-
timated the true effect. Further, contextual factors may 
have affected the difference in effect sizes, and behavioral 
norms in particular (e.g., Grube, Morgan, & McGree, 1986; 
Nucifora, Gallois, & Kashima, 1993). Some research sug-
gests that the norm for students used to participating in 
economic studies is to maximize payoffs, more so than 
for students used to participating in psychological stud-
ies (Cappelen, Nygaard, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2015; 
Carter & Irons, 1991; Gerlach, 2017). We do not compare 
the behavioral norms of these groups. Rather, we directly 
examine whether causally manipulating behavioral norms 
affects corruption in collaboration.
To this end, we included norms as a moderator in Study 2. 
We manipulated the norm by showing participants a 
visual representation of the findings of the two previous 
studies (for a similar manipulation, see Kroher & Wolbring, 
2015; Rauhut, 2013). Participants were either shown a 
representation of a distribution of results in which partici-
pants lied very often (High behavioral norm), i.e., Weisel 
and Shalvi’s (2015) data, or less often (Low Behavioral 
norm), i.e., our Study 1 data (see Appendix B for details). 
We tested a sample similar to Weisel and Shalvi’s: 
students who are used to participating in economic stud-
ies (recruited with ORSEE; Greiner, 2015). The results 
showed that participants in the High behavioral norm 
condition reported more doubles (M = 67%, SD = 31%) 
than participants in the Low behavioral norm4 (M = 47%, 
SD = 30%; see Table 1).
Our studies have several strengths, such as being pre-
registered and replicating a reported large effect, which 
may have real-life consequences. However, our studies 
also have limitations. First, we did not include Wiesel and 
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Shalvi’s (2015) Individuals condition in our studies. Hence, 
we did not replicate their core finding that collaboration 
increases cheating relative to solitary play. Second, we 
used a lower monetary compensation than Weisel and 
Shalvi, possibly reducing our participants’ motivation to 
lie. Although higher incentives do not necessarily increase 
the magnitude of lies (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; 
Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), future research may systemat-
ically examine the extent to which size of incentives influ-
ence the magnitude of dishonesty in collaborative settings.
Finally, our results converge with the idea that collabo-
rative settings can lead to dishonest behavior. Corrupt 
collaboration can have significant real-life consequences, 
but the severity of these consequences is likely to depend 
on context. Previous research highlights the role of social 
norms and beliefs about such norms in the spreading of 
dishonest behavior (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008; 
Rauhut, 2013). Here, we provided evidence suggesting 
that norms can shape dishonest behavior in a collabora-
tive setting. Investigating what norms increase or decrease 
dishonesty in real-life settings is a promising avenue for 
future research.
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Notes
 1 www.osf.io/gh5pd.
 2 All data was processed and analyzed in RStudio (RStudio, 
2012), which is an integrated development environ-
ment for R (R Core Team, 2015). Analyses were run with 
either MLwiN (Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, & 
Cameron, 2009) and / or the lme4 package (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015).
 3 For Studies 1 and 2, we also investigated whether the 
dishonesty of player A would influence the dishonesty 
of player B. These results are discussed in Appendix C.
 4 We used to two different models to analyze the data 
(see Appendix D for details of these models). The 
results were similar, both indicating a difference 
between the two conditions (model 1: χ2(1) = 4.18, 
p = .04, model 2: χ2(1) = 3.04, p = .09).
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